Chicago Cubs: What led to Carl Edwards’ late-season implosion?

Last season, right-hander Carl Edwards Jr. took a step in the wrong direction, spiraling out of control when it mattered most for the Chicago Cubs.

Now, the above statement tells you nothing you aren’t already aware of. The more important question, though, for the Chicago Cubs, is what caused their young hard-throwing reliever to flame out late in the season when they needed him at his best.

On the whole, looking at Carl Edwards Jr.‘s line from 2018 would hardly draw suspicion from anyone who didn’t see him pitch in the season’s final month. He put up a 2.60 ERA (2.93 FIP) and struck out 11.3 batters per nine in 58 appearances for manager Joe Maddon. You certainly can’t take that performance for granted given the injuries to guys like Brian Duensing, Pedro Strop and Brandon Morrow.

But it was in that final month of the season – with all three of these guys shelved or ineffective – that Edwards faltered. Instead of rising to the occasion and spearheading an overworked pen in need of a reliable arm outside of Steve Cishek, Jesse Chavez or Jorge De La Rosa, the lanky right-hander was seemingly unable to find the strike zone in any way, shape or form.

So instead of just talking about his struggles in a very high-level sense, let’s drill down into the numbers and see if we can figure out what went wrong for Edwards Jr. and what the Cubs can do to get him back on the right track in 2019.

Chicago Cubs: Edwards goes from white-hot to icy cold on a dime

Obviously, we all remember the September turned in by Edwards. We’ll get to that a bit later on in this discussion. But what many fans forget are the first two months of the campaign – which couldn’t form a more stark contrast when put side-by-side.

In March/April, the right-hander racked up 13 2/3 innings of 0.66 ERA ball, limiting opponents to a minuscule .146 clip. Perhaps more importantly, he turned in a 23:5 strikeout-to-walk ratio. In short, he was feeling himself early in the year. Then, things went sideways. As the calendar flipped to May, Edwards went from the toast of the relief corps to a completely unreliable option.

That month, he put up an unsightly 5.56 earned run average across 11 1/3 innings – and opponents hit .244 – an increase of nearly 100 full points over the month prior. He still turned in a semi-respectable 17:7 strikeout-to-walk ratio, but that clearly trended in the wrong direction, as well.

Now, as the summer wore on, Edwards seemed to level off. He didn’t pitch in June, but rebounded in July and August, setting himself up well for the home stretch of the campaign. Of course, Morrow didn’t take the mound the entire second half, so, at least in the interim, the lanky righty stepped up at the perfect time.

Until he didn’t.

Chicago Cubs: The guy for clean frames, not pressure-packed dilemnas

In Game 7 of the 2016 World Series, Ken Rosenthal stood on the sidelines and relayed that Maddon would only go to veteran left-hander Jon Lester in a ‘clean inning.’ Of course, the Cubs manager bucked that trend mid-game, but that same concept could have been applied to Edwards Jr. in 2018.

In low-leverage appearances, the 27-year-old hurler posted a 2.72 xFIP, 14.14 K/9 and stranded 80.7 percent of baserunners – well above the typical league average of 70-72 percent. He also cut down on the free passes, walking just 3.86 men per nine (which clocks in well below his career average of 4.92 BB/9.

But in what Fangraphs deemed ‘high-leverage’ situations, Edwards Jr. struggled mightily. His xFIP sykrocketed to 5.95, his strikeout rate fell from north of 14 per nine all the way down to just 6.75 K/9 and his walks skyrocketed to nearly six per nine innings pitched. His LOB%? That plummeted down to 46.7 percent, as well.

Now, the LOB% decline is expected – if you inherit runners, rather than start an inning for yourself, the odds are inherently higher at least one crosses the plate. But the Chicago Cubs need Edwards to become the guy who can step into such instances and keep opponents off the board – and they need it to happen sooner rather than later.

Chicago Cubs: So what exactly went wrong for Carl Edwards Jr.?

With a little deeper understanding of exactly where Edwards Jr. struggled last season, we can really dive into how he attacked hitters differently – and, perhaps, decipher some key takeaways that he (hopefully) takes into 2019.

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The right-hander is known for his lively fastball – and with good reason. When he’s painting corners, opponents have little chance of squaring anything up. But instead of relying on that pitch in 2018, he turned away from it in a big way – throwing it 10 percent less than in 2015 and nearly six percent less than just one year prior.

And the numbers bore witness to a staggering decline in the pitch’s effectiveness – despite his not losing much velocity on it. In the Cubs’ World Series championship season, his fastball had an 11.2 wFB (Fastball runs above average). In 2017? That climbed to a career-best 12.5 wFB. But last season, it dropped to an unsightly 4.7 mark.

In 2017, opponents took a cut at 59.8 percent of pitches in the strike zone. That number rose to 66.7 percent last year while they cut down how many chase pitches they swung at by a full three percent. In short, he went from slightly above league average in getting guys to swing at balls outside the strike zone to roughly league average.

Perhaps most importantly when looking at these swing rates is the results. Yes, guys swung at more pitches in the strike zone (taking hacks at roughly two of every three pitches) – but it’s what they did with said pitches that’s so worrisome.

In his career, Edwards carries a 40.4 percent groundball rate. But in 2018, that number dropped down to just 28.9 percent. Simultaneously, his fly ball rate lept up to 43.8 percent – an increase of seven percent year-over-year. Opponents’ ability to get the ball in the air – and his maddening inability to find the zone under pressure – cost him dearly, especially down the stretch.

There are a lot of takeaways from Carl Edwards Jr.’s 2018 performance. While the overall body of work was solid – he must find a way to dictate the zone more effectively, get more balls on the ground and limit the self-inflicted damage. Otherwise, his showing in the upcoming season may prove to be just as volatile as what we bore witness to late last year.